The reform of civil procedure: isolationism or harmonisation? by Jolowicz, J. A.
The reform of civil 
procedure: isolationism or 
harmonisation?
by J A Jolowicz
The Third Annual Lecture to be presented by the Society for 
Advanced Legal Studies was given by Professor J A Jolowicz on 8 June 
2000. The text of his speech is reproduced below.
Paradoxes are meat and drink to an academic lecturer. They enable him to show off in two or three different ways. First, he can parade his 
perception by bringing the paradox to the attention of his 
audience. Secondly, he can demonstrate his learning by 
showing how the paradox came into being. Thirdly, if he is 
lucky, he can illustrate his technical skills by resolving the 
paradox. He might even conclude that his paradox is 
apparent rather than real. If he does that, his academic 
credentials are put beyond question: his lecture goes round 
in a circle and his audience is left at the end exactly where 
it was at the beginning.
I have a sort of paradox for this lecture, but it is a 
paradox of a kind that is more likely to arise in the world 
of politics than in the world of law. We have different 
groups of people, many of whom are personally known to 
each other, engaged in reform activities in the same field 
and at the same time, and none of them pays any attention 
to what is being done by the others.
This is what is happening today in the reform of civil 
procedure. Two different kinds of activity have been going 
on for some time now, each in virtual isolation from the 
other. On the one hand there is the reform or revision on 
a large scale of national procedural systems, which I will 
call 'Woolf-like' reform. On the other there is the effort to 
reduce the differences between national procedural 
systems. Today this is usually called 'harmonisation', or 
sometimes 'approximation'. We have become too 
experienced to speak any longer of 'unification', though 
some countries such as France, in the 17th, and Germany 
in the 19th, century, managed to unify the different 
systems previously applicable in different parts of the
country, and, I understand, Switzerland will manage it in 
2002 when a single federal code of civil procedure will 
replace the separate codes now in force in the various 
cantons.
So we have Woolf-like reform and attempts at 
harmonisation being carried on without reference to eacho
other, save that the harmonisers say that the Woolf-like 
reformers are making things worse by increasing the 
divergences between their different systems. But that is not 
all. Each of the numerous Woolf-like national reforms   
including those of France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Portugal 
and Spain, as well as our own   has been carried out as a 
purely national exercise. I will not say that in none of these 
countries was any attention paid to what others were 
doing. It would, indeed, be wrong to suggest that Lordo ' ' o oo
Woolf consulted no lawyers from other jurisdictions before 
finalising his recommendations, but it is difficult to detect 
any significant outside influence in the Civil Procedure 
Rules ('CPR') as they have emerged, save that case 
management in the common law started in the US. On ao
broader level, a distinguished Italian expert observed, in 
1999, that:
'the history of procedural law in the 1 990s shows a 
proliferation of reforms of codes oj procedure, reforms that, at 
least in Europe, seem to have been influenced not at all by 
comparison \vith the procedural law of other member states.'
What I want to do in this lecture is to ask the question 
whether the national reformers, and especially our own, 
are justified in their isolationist approach. Are they right to 
believe, as apparently they do, that what is done in other 
countries cannot usefully influence their views as to what
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should be done in their own? The question is important 
for its own sake, but it is also important because, if the 
answer is affirmative, then the outlook for harmonisation 
is bleak. First, however, I should like to say a little more 
about current and recent attempts at harmonisation, in 
one of which I was myself engaged.
HARMONISATION
There has, of course, been some procedural 
harmonisation within the European Union by, for 
example, the Brussels Convention on jurisdiction and 
judgments. I must make it clear, therefore, that in this 
lecture I use the phrase civil procedure in a restricted 
sense. I am concerned only with the procedure whereby a 
case is handled from its inception by the issue of a claim 
form, or whatever, until judgment. I have nothing to say 
today about the Brussels or other similar conventions, and 
I shall not mention the European Convention on Human 
Rights.
The case for harmonisation of civil procedure in a world 
of international exchanges at all levels and of the growth of 
regional organisations such as the European Union is 
simple enough. First there is the argument   essentially 
one of equity (small 'e') and transparency   that a citizen 
involved in an international dispute should not find his 
dispute dealt with by a different procedure according to 
the nationality of the court before which it comes. 
Secondly, there is the argument that any attempt to apply 
a more or less uniform substantive law in more than one 
jurisdiction is unlikely to produce uniform results if 
different jurisdictions deal with similar cases quite 
differently. Gutteridge pointed out, in 1946, that:
'similarity of rule in two or more systems of law, in the 
substantive sense, may easily be nullified by divergences in 
procedure'.
He thought it obvious that:o
'no scheme of unification can be regarded as satisfactory if 
proceedings in one of the participating countries are more dilatory 
or more expensive than in others, or if the remedies afforded by 
the uniform law are not the same.'
These words were written before even the European 
Coal and Steel Community came into being, and we all 
know how much substantive harmonisation of civil and 
commercial law has been attempted since then, both 
within and outside the European Union. We have 
directives and conventions by the score, and it is natural 
that interest in the harmonisation of procedural law has 
grown and continues to grow. The subject has become a 
staple for discussion at international congresses, and there 
is a growing literature.
Purely academic activity apart, there have been at least 
three major efforts to bring some harmonisation to the 
rules of civil procedure, one limited to the member states
of the European Union, one which it is hoped may be 
applicable world-wide, and one designed for Latin 
America.
The first, the European one, began as the almost private 
venture of an enthusiastic Belgian law professor and 
practitioner, Marcel Storme, who gathered a group of 
experts in procedure, one from each of the then twelve 
member states. The group began work in 1987, and Sir 
Jack Jacob was the first member from this country; I 
succeeded him in 1989, by which time Professor Storme 
had managed to obtain some support from the European 
Commission. The group submitted its report to the 
Commission in 1993, and a published version appeared in 
1994.
The second is an ongoing project of the American Law 
Institute. Unlike the European project, which looked to 
directives or other European legislation to give its 
proposals legal force in all member states, this project aims 
to do no more than to produce a set of 'Transnational 
Rules of Civil Procedure' which could be adopted by any 
state and which would have the force of law only in so far 
as a given state has chosen to adopt them. Work on this is 
quite well advanced but is still in progress.
The third project I wish to mention is actually the 
oldest. In 1988 the Ibero-American Institute of 
Procedural Law, an international non-governmental7 o
association, produced a model code of civil procedure. 
This code binds no one and is not even intended 
necessarily to be adopted as a whole in any country.
The fate of the Storme Group's attempt is not 
encouraging. In a first flush of enthusiasm the group 
believed that it could produce a draft code of civil 
procedure for Europe that would, in due course, be 
introduced into all the member states. It was not long,o7
however, before everyone realised that this was grossly 
overambitious. In its final report the group submitted draft 
rules on a number of specific topics with the 
recommendation that they should be made the subject of 
one or more directives, and that, so far as practical 
consequences are concerned, is pretty well the end of that 
story. No action on the report has been taken by the 
European Commission and most Woolf-like reformers 
seem to be unaware of it.
The fate of the project for the transnational rules will 
not be known for some time to come, but it is noteworthy 
that here, too, the original idea proved overambitious. In 
this case work started with the idea that, subject only to 
certain specified exceptions, the rules would apply in all 
civil and commercial matters in which the plaintiff and the 
defendant were nationals of different states. In the current 
draft, the scope of the rules is no longer stated as a general 
proposition subject to exceptions. The rules are now 
stated to apply only in a number of specified categories of 
commercial and other financial cases. This change is
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largely due to the surviving use of jury trial in so many 
classes of case in the US. A procedural system that did not 
allow for jury trial in, say, tort cases, would be 
unacceptable and probably unconstitutional in the US, but 
one which did allow jury trial would be unacceptable in 
civil law countries.
Up to the present, only the third, the Ibero-American, 
project can claim any actual success. The model code was 
adopted virtually unchanged as the code of civil procedure 
in Uruguay and in one state of Argentina, and a number of 
other countries have adopted some of the principles or 
particular features of the model. The influence of the 
model code is also evident in drafts of a new national code 
for Argentina and in reforms of procedure in the course of 
preparation and introduction in Brazil and Peru.
IS ISOLATIONISM JUSTIFIED?
I can now turn to my principal question. Are the Woolf- 
like reformers justified in adopting a go-it-alone 
approach?
I begin with Sir Jack Jacob's vehement rejection of the 
suggestion that the English adversarial system should be 
replaced by what he called 'the Continental inquisitorial 
system'. In his words, the suggestion:J 7 oo
'does not take into account some imponderable intangibles, 
such as the cultural texture of society, the habits and practices of 
the legal profession, the needs, values and aspirations of the 
people, their inarticulate concepts of how civil justice should be 
administered'.
Sir Jack's argument contains a salutary warning, but too 
much should not be made of it. The cultural, political, 
social, and economic conditions prevailing in the 
developed countries of the world are not so varied that 
their procedures for handling civil litigation should be 
thought to have nothing in common with one another. The 
Storme Report argues that the differences that exist 
between the common and the civil law systems of 
procedure are ultimately of a formal or terminological 
nature, and a similar argument is advanced in the 
introduction to the draft transnational rules. There the 
authors set out what they see as similarities and differences 
in procedural systems. The differences, they say, are 
'important differences, but not worlds of difference', and 
they find the similarities in matters of broad principle   for 
example in requirements for a neutral adjudicator, for the 
defendant to be given notice of proceedings against him, 
and for the ultimate finality of judgments.
They do not say as much, but they might also have said 
that the belief of many common lawyers that Continental 
systems are 'inquisitorial', is misconceived. There are 
some Continental procedures which are avowedly 
inquisitorial, such as that used in the French administrative 
courts, but ordinary civil procedure, though not fully 
'adversarial' in the English sense, is not 'inquisitorial'
either. Continental civil procedure is usually described as 
'accusatorial'. As we shall see, the Continental judge does 
play a more important role than his English counterpart in 
the fact-finding process, but he is by no means an 
inquisitor.
To say this, however, is to say only that the general 
principles of Continental and common law systems of civil 
procedure are less different from each other than may 
sometimes be supposed on this side of the Channel. It is 
not to say much about the actual feasibility of 
harmonisation. To go further calls for attention to the 
detail of particular aspects of procedure in more than one 
system, to see how far each is, or can be made, compatible 
with the inarticulate premises and prejudices of the other.
That was the kind of work attempted by the Storme 
Working Group, whose members met for several days at a 
time, three or four times a year. Even so, and bearing in 
mind that they had to study far more topics than the few 
on which they were finally able to agree, it took them six 
years. All I can do this evening is to look at one aspect of 
civil procedure and to do so in two legal systems only. For 
this purpose I have chosen the use of experts in English 
and French law.
EXPERTS
I shall come later to Part 35 of the new rules. For the 
moment I concentrate on the old system, when we used 
expert witnesses who were really witnesses and were called by 
the parties to help them discharge their burdens of proof. 
As with any other witness, the expert witness was subject 
to cross-examination, and where a conflict of expert 
evidence emerged, the judge had to resolve it for himself.o 7 -* o
He had no independent expert assistance of his own, 
except in those rare cases where he sat with an assessor.
This system has often been criticised, and not only for 
its extravagance in time and money, but something like it 
was inevitable for so long as jury trial was the norm, and 
that was long enough for it to be seen generally in this 
country as the natural way to do things.
Nowr, whatever may be said against the system of expert 
witnesses as we knew it, one thing that it did achieve was7 o
to secure automatic observance of what, in France, is 
called the principle of contradiction. This is similar to, but 
rather broader than, audi alteram partem and it insists that 
the judge may take into account nothing that the parties 
have not had the opportunity to debate. The principle is 
taken care of automatically in a traditional adversary 
system simply because, with a jury, the judge of fact can, in 
the nature of things, know nothing of the case to be tried 
until the parties present their evidence at the trial. The 
same is true for cases tried by judge alone, if the trial judge 
is isolated from the pre-trial stages of the action. His 
decision can only be based on the evidence adduced by the 
parties in open court, and it follows that each party has the
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opportunity to challenge   to 'contradict'   the evidence 
adduced by his opponent. This applies to expert as to all 
other kinds of evidence.
As is widely known, the system for dealing with experts 
in France, and indeed in other civil law countries, is 
different from our own. Experts are not witnesses and they 
are not designated by the parties. It is the judge who 
appoints the expert, it is the judge who instructs him, and 
it is to the judge that the expert reports. It is not without 
reason that the expert in France is described as auxiliaire de 
la justice and, indeed, as auxiliaire du juge.
This is a system in which the principle of contradiction 
is not automatically taken care of. If left unqualified, it 
would give no right to the parties to have any say at all on 
the technical or scientific questions that arise in the case, 
and, of course, it is not left unqualified. The code itself 
requires, quite generally, that, in all circumstances, the 
judge must both ensure observation of the principle of 
contradiction and observe it himself, and there is 
important case law applying this principle to the use of 
experts. For the purposes of comparison, however, the 
point is not that the principle of contradiction is 
protected, but that its protection depends on a specific 
provision in the law: it is not automatic.
If we now place these two systems alongside one 
another, we see that, under the French system the judge 
has the power to obtain such information and advice from 
an independent expert as he considers necessary to enable 
him to get as near as possible to the truth. Procedural 
justice has to be safeguarded by a kind of add-on extra. 
Substantive justice comes first. In the English system, by 
contrast, the judge must rely on what the parties put 
before him. Procedural justice comes first, substantive 
justice second.
It is obviously dangerous to generalise from just one 
example, and as I have already said, it would be wrong to 
characterise French civil procedure as inquisitorial. The 
code insists, for example, that it is for each party to prove 
the facts on which the success of his claim or defence 
depends. I have also said, however, that the Continental 
judge plays a more important role than his English 
counterpart in the fact-finding process. Part of the 
explanation of this is that certain procedures, which we 
would classify as the introduction of evidence or proof, are 
not regarded as such in French law, and the parties do not 
control them. The supply of expert information and advice 
is one example, and there is time for me to mention just 
one other. The parties to litigation are not competent 
witnesses and cannot give evidence in the normal way. But 
the judge may, if he sees fit, summon the parties to appear 
before him personally and examine them himself. What he 
learns from this is not 'evidence,' but in modern French 
law the personal appearance of the parties has become an 
important procedure. What the judge learns from the 
answers to his questions, from any refusal to answer, and
from a party's demeanour, he will take into account in 
coming to a decision.o
For reasons such as those I have tried to bring out in 
speaking of experts, I am myself sceptical about the present 
possibilities for significant harmonisation of procedure in 
common and civil law jurisdictions. The underlying 
differences of theory, such as the inbuilt but unmentioned 
priority given, or not given, to substantive over procedural 
justice and the instinctive or knee-jerk reactions to 
proposed change that those differences are likely to 
provoke, seem to me too great for diat. I respectfully differ 
from those of my colleagues on the Storme Working Group 
and from those involved in drafting the transnational rules 
who see the differences between the common and the civil 
law as less of an obstacle than I do. It follows that I have 
come reluctantly to the conclusion, at least for one of the 
only two common law countries in the European Union, 
that I cannot condemn the relative isolation from foreign 
ideas in which the recent reforms of our civil procedure 
have been prepared.
So much for the present. I want now to engage in a bit 
of crystal gazing and to suggest that many of the obstacles
J O O OO J
that I now see to harmonisation of common and civil law 
procedures, obstacles which justify isolationism, will 
diminish in the future, and in time, perhaps, disappear 
altogether. I shall restrict my remarks on this to 
developments in English civil procedure and what I see as 
predictable consequences of recent reforms, but there 
have been parallel developments in civil law countries.
VIRTUAL ISOLATIOK
Two different kinds of ^^^^"fGWWjfeen going on for 
some time now, each in virtual isolation from the other. 
On the one hand there is the reform or revision on a 
large scale of national procedural systems, which I will 
call 'Woolf-like' reform. On the other there is the effort 
to reduce the differences between national procedural 
systems.
It is important to recall at the outset that few of the 
recent reforms to English civil procedure would have been 
possible while the jury was regularly used in our civil 
courts, but the virtual disappearance of the civil jury is at 
last beginning to affect not just the content of the rules of 
procedure, but also the inarticulate premises from which 
conscious thinking begins. Having already used the 
procedure for what we still call expert evidence as my 
working example, let me look briefly at the law as it has 
become under the CPR.
Despite all the criticisms of the old system, Lord Woolf 
did not propose the introduction of court-appointed and 
court-instructed experts, and Part 35 of the CPR does not 
introduce the Continental system. What it has done, for 
better or for worse, is to introduce a hybrid.
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Amongst the most striking features of the new law areo o
the imposition on the expert of a duty to assist the court, 
a duty that overrides any duty the expert may owe to the 
person instructing him, and the supporting practice 
direction which requires the expert to address his report 
to the court. The idea that the expert witness should give 
evidence independent of the interests of the party 
instructing him appeared in the cases before Lord Woolf 
completed his report, but the new rule makes the point 
clear beyond argument.
This is enough to show how far we have moved from the 
idea of an expert witness called to support the case of the 
party calling him, but there is more. Experts may not be 
called without the court's permission and even so their 
evidence should be submitted in writing unless furthero
permission is obtained for them to give oral testimony. The 
opportunity for cross-examination   essential to our 
notions of procedural justice   is much reduced. Finally, 
where two or more parties wish to submit expert evidence 
on a particular issue, the court may direct that the 
evidence on that issue is to be given by a single expert.
On the other side of the coin, there is a pood deal left of
' o
party control. One example lies in the curious rule that, 
even where a direction is given for a single expert, it is not 
for the judge either to designate the expert or to give him 
his instructions. If the parties are unable to agree upon a 
single expert, the judge is still not given a free hand and   
which is even more curious   whatever the way in which 
the expert is finally chosen, each party remains free to give 
his own instructions to the designated expert.
Speaking personally, I see this new system as one which is 
intended to ensure, so far as possible, that the judge receives 
a single, uncontradicted, expert report on the technical 
matters arising in the case without provoking the kind of 
antagonism and cries of 'inquisitorial' to which open 
adoption of the Continental system would give rise. But I 
also believe, with all respect to those who designed the new 
system, that it does not bridge the gap between what we had 
before and what is done on the Continent. It falls into it. 
There is no viable half-way house between a party-driven 
and a judge-driven system. And even if I am wrong about 
that, the new system, unlike the old, does not secure the 
automatic observance of the principle of contradiction, and 
yet it provides no independent safeguard.
I cannot help thinking, therefore, that, sooner or later, 
Part 35 is going to need radical change. It can either go 
back, more or less, to a party-driven system, or it can bite 
on the bullet and move to a court-appointed and court- 
instructed expert such as exists on the Continent. If things 
work out so that Part 35 has to be substantially revised in 
the relatively near future then my crystal ball shows a shift 
backwards in the direction of experts as genuine witnesses. 
On the other hand, if, as I expect, the weaknesses in the 
structure of Part 35 do not bring about its collapse until
today's judges and senior practitioners   who know the old 
system   have been replaced by today's students   who do 
not   then I believe that the change will be towards allowing 
the judge to select and instruct his own expert. Such a 
change would necessarily be accompanied by appropriate 
protection of the principle of contradiction, and we should 
have come, more or less openly, to put substantive ahead of 
procedural justice in the Continental manner.
I have already acknowledged the dangers of generalising 
from a single example, but in a single lecture such dangers 
have to be faced. I believe that it will not only be in dealing 
with experts that future generations of English lawyers will 
be more willing than is the present generation to put 
substantive ahead of procedural justice. The introduction 
of case management and many of the reforms that 
preceded the Woolf Report have brought an end to the old 
idea that the best trial judge is the judge who knows next 
to nothing of the case he is to try until the trial begins. We 
still have a trial, but in most cases an immense amount of 
the evidence is available to the judge in documentary form 
before the trial begins, and he is encouraged to pre-read it.
This move away from the trial judge to whom a case has 
to be 'opened' also presages another shift towards 
Continental ways of thinking. There, there is no trial as we 
know it and the purpose of the procedures that precede 
the stage at which a case is put to the court for final 
decision is rightly seen as preparation for decision. Here the 
old idea about pre-trial procedures was, of course, that the 
primary purpose is preparation for trial. Given the extent 
to which our modern 'pre-trial' procedures operate to 
bring into court a great deal of information about the 
evidence on which the decision will be based, how long 
will it be before we too attribute to those procedures the 
primary role of preparation for decision rather than for 
trial?
In bringing this ramble to an end, I want to speculate a 
step further about the predictable effects of making 
available to the court so much of the evidence before the 
trial begins. If the adversary system is as we were told it is 
by the House of Lords in the Air Canada case in 1982, that 
is, a system in which the court is not entitled, let alone 
obliged, to look for an independent truth, and in which 
the court's duty is to decide only in accordance with the 
evidence provided by the parties, then the adversary 
system cannot, in my view, long survive. The days in which 
the only purpose of a system of civil justice was to provide 
a non-violent alternative to self-help are long since over, 
and the notion that the court has no duty to the truth is 
unpalatable. Indeed, it runs counter to ordinary ideas of 
what justice is about.
In the past, when the judge could know nothing about 
the case before the trial began, it was impossible for him 
even to be aware that, say, the evidence before him was 
incomplete, until all the evidence had been heard, and by
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then it was too late for him to do anything about it. Now, 
however, the judge   or at least the procedural judge   
knows, and must know, a great deal about the parties' 
evidence and Part 3 2 of the CPR actually gives him power 
to control the evidence. For how long will he be able to 
hold, and for how long will he wish to hold, the 
unattractive line of denying that he has a duty to the truth?
I have suggested that today's generation of lawyers, who 
were brought up under the old system and are bound to 
see the post-Woolf law as to some extent a departure from 
the norm, will continue to find obstacles to harmonisation 
  real or imagined. They may even be right, if they focus 
on topics outside civil procedure as I have defined it for 
this lecture and which it has not been possible for me to 
mention, such as the differences between the Continental 
and the English judiciary and legal professions.
But I believe that in time   when the new Civil 
Procedure Rules have become the system in which all but 
the most ancient of lawyers were brought up   then it will 
be realised that our law is not, in its modes of thought and7 o
in its underlying, unstated, assumptions, any longer so 
different from the Continental.
I believe, therefore, that the proposition of Professor 
Storme and of the authors of the transnational rules, with 
which I earlier expressed disagreement, was premature 
rather than wrong for all time. If that is right, and if it iso o '
right that there is already an important and growing degree 
of unconscious harmonisation   convergence, to use a 
word now fashionable in economics   then the idea that 
deliberate harmonisation has a realistic prospect of success 
will cease to seem far-fetched. Isolationist approaches to 
the reform of civil procedure will cease to be sustainable, 
and what was not, after all, a paradox, will actually become 
one, unless we pay greater attention to the procedural 
systems of other countries and their reform. I hardly need 
say that the same goes for those others as well. @
Professor J A Jolowicz
Trinity College, Cambridge
The labyrinth of major fraud
by George Staple QC
The author, a partner in Clifford Chance and a former Director of the Serious 
Fraud Office, addresses the issue of overlap between different investigations and 
proceedings in major fraud cases and offers some suggestions for harmonisation.
I t must be counted a blessing of the English legal system that when a major financial scandal breaks there is available a range of different processes, each 
one specially designed to respond to a different facet of 
the case.
But anyone who has been involved with one of the 
major fraud cases of recent years (whether as investigator, 
regulator, prosecutor, victim or defendant) cannot help 
but ask whether a system with so much overlap between 
different investigations and proceedings cannot be made 
to work more efficiently.
Our system involves enormous expense and delay, and 
there is now real concern about the impact on such delay 
of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). 
In a recent case before the Court of Human Rights in
which directors' disqualification proceedings had been 
stayed until the end of the criminal trial, the court found 
unacceptable delay, which was contrary to the right to a 
fair trial under art. 6 of the convention. So the problem 
has become urgent.
THE RANGE OF PROCEEDINGS
Let us just pause a moment to consider the range and 
nature of all these different processes.
  Criminal proceedings may be brought by the Serious 
Fraud Office, CPS or other prosecuting authorities, e.g. 
HM Customs & Excise or the Inland Revenue. The 
criminal process is, of course, concerned with the 
attribution of blame to a particular individual or group 
of individuals.
Amicus Curiae Issue 29 July 2000
